June 30, 2020

The Honorable Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye
Chief Justice of the State of California
and the Honorable Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of California
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA  94102-4797

Re: Letter of Amici Curiae Requesting Depublication of the Lower Court Opinion in Handoush v. Lease Finance Group LLC, No. S259523 (Cal.)

Dear Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices:

Along with my colleagues at Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, I represent the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. My clients intended to participate as amici curiae in support of Lease Finance Group LLC in the above-referenced appeal.*

We write to provide the Court with an explanation of why Lease Finance Group LLC failed to timely file its opening brief and offer our view on the appropriate disposition of this appeal—specifically, an order dismissing the petition for review for failure to prosecute but directing the depublication of the lower court’s decision, Handoush v. Lease Fin. Group, LLC., 41 Cal. App. 5th 729 (2019). The California Supreme Court is expressly authorized to direct the depublication of opinions under California Rule of Court 8.1105. Doing so here would preserve the status quo between the parties while erasing the precedential effect of the lower court’s decision, which this Court will no longer have the opportunity to review.

A. Interests of Amici Curiae

This appeal raises the question whether a California court must decline to enforce a forum selection clause included in a contract that was formed in another State, and which selects a forum outside California for litigation, simply because the contract also includes a pre-dispute jury trial

* No party or any counsel for any party to this litigation authored this letter in whole or in part. No person or entity—other than the amici curiae, its members, or its counsel—made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this letter.
waiver. The Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held that such a forum-selection clause is *per se* unenforceable because, even though it was included in a contract that is governed by non-California law, California has a public policy against enforcing pre-dispute jury trial waivers.

The *amici curiae* each have an interest in the question presented by this appeal. The *amici* and their members include organizations and entities that enter into (or develop forms of) contracts that are not governed by California law and that include a forum selection clause and a pre-dispute jury trial waiver. They have an interest in seeing that these contracts are consistently enforced by the courts inside and outside of California and ensuring that each State respects the policy choices of its sister States.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America is the world’s largest business federation. It represents approximately 300,000 direct members and indirectly represents the interests of more than 3 million companies and professional organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from every region of the country. An important function of the Chamber is to represent the interests of its members in matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts. To that end, the Chamber regularly files *amicus curiae* briefs in cases that raise issues of concern to the nation’s business community.

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) is the leading trade association for broker-dealers, investment banks, and asset managers operating in the United States and global capital markets. On behalf of the industry’s nearly one million employees, SIFMA advocates on legislation, regulation, and business policy, affecting retail and institutional investors, equity and fixed income markets, and related products and services. An important function of SIFMA is to represent the interests of its members in cases addressing issues of widespread concern in the securities and financial markets.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) is the global trade association representing leading participants in the derivatives industry. Since 1985, ISDA has worked to make global derivatives markets safer and more efficient. Today, ISDA has over 900 member institutions from 74 countries. These members comprise a broad range of derivatives market participants, including corporations, investment managers, government and supranational entities, insurance companies, energy and commodities firms, and international and regional banks. In addition to market participants, members also include key components of the derivatives market infrastructure, such as exchanges, intermediaries, clearing houses and repositories, as well as law firms, accounting firms and other service providers.

**B. Why Lease Finance Group Has Failed to Prosecute this Appeal**

On May 29, 2020, Lease Finance Group LLC was enjoined from “conducting the business of equipment finance leasing or collection of debts under equipment finance leases and from purchasing, financing, transferring, servicing, or enforcing equipment finance leases.” *New York v. N. Leasing Sys.*,
Inc., No. 450460/2016, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2564, *44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2020) (attached). In that same proceeding, which was initiated by the Attorney General of the State of New York, the court also ordered the dissolution of Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., an affiliate of Lease Finance Group LLC. See id. at *40-42. As a result, Lease Finance Group has apparently taken the position that it may no longer prosecute the above-referenced appeal—presumably, because this appeal involves Lease Finance Group’s efforts to transfer a debt-collection action to the State of New York.

C. Proposed Disposition of this Appeal: Dismissal and Depublication

Lease Finance Group is apparently no longer prosecuting this appeal. If that remains the case, this Court should dismiss the petition for review. That outcome would preserve the status quo between the parties.

At the same time, this Court can—and should—direct the depublication of the lower court’s opinion, Handoush v. Lease Finance Group, LLC, 41 Cal. App. 5th 729 (2019), under California Rule of Court 8.1105. As explained below, the opinion of the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District is seriously misguided. This Court intended to review the opinion, but will not be able to do so. Depublication would avoid prejudice to future litigants by permitting them to explain to the First Appellate District why its decision should not be followed in the future.

1. The Lower Court’s Decision Would Result in the Invalidation of Millions of Contracts and Impose Increased Costs Borne by Consumers.

Californians have entered into thousands, if not millions, of contracts that are governed by non-California law and subject to litigation in some other jurisdiction. The provisions of these contracts are now in jeopardy any time such an agreement includes a pre-dispute jury trial waiver—even if that waiver is valid and enforceable under the law that all parties agreed would govern the contract at issue.

Parties enter into contracts with forum selection clauses and pre-dispute jury trial waivers because they provide certainty and reduce costs. Further, parties to these contracts depend on every State to honor the bargain struck under another State’s law. These laudable goals of predictability and fairness are in jeopardy within the First Appellate District if this Court does not depublish the lower court’s ruling.

2. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is Contrary to State Law and Unnecessary to Protect the Interests of California’s Citizens.

California law already recognizes the importance of forum selection clauses, see Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d 491 (1976)—and for good reason. As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, courts should be loath to set aside forum selection clauses:
When parties have contracted in advance to litigate disputes in a particular forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ settled expectations. A forum selection clause, after all, may have figured centrally in the parties’ negotiations and may have affected how they set monetary and other contractual terms; it may, in fact, have been a critical factor in their agreement to do business together in the first place. In all but the most unusual cases, therefore, ‘the interest of justice’ is served by holding parties to their bargain.


The parties’ decision to adopt a New York forum selection clause should have ended the Court of Appeal’s inquiry. Once the court recognized the validity of that clause, it was up to a court of the selected forum state to resolve any remaining disputes about the contract.

Instead, the Court of Appeal looked beyond the forum selection clause and determined the validity of a pre-dispute jury trial waiver. _Handoush_, 41 Cal. App. 5th at 734. And then, rather than apply New York law, which governed the contract at issue, the Court of Appeal applied California law, which deems pre-dispute jury trial waivers unenforceable. _Id._ at 735-39. This cart-before-the-horse approach was erroneous.

The Court of Appeal invoked California’s policy against pre-dispute waivers, but that policy had no application. The parties agreed that their contract had been executed in New York, that it was subject to New York law, and that it was to be litigated in a New York court. _Id._ at 732. New York enforces a pre-dispute waiver of a jury trial right, and a California court cannot override that policy determination. Principles of federalism and comity prevent it from doing so.

3. **The Decision of the Court of Appeal Results in the Extraterritorial Application of California Law and is Contrary to Principles of Comity.**

By refusing to enforce the contract’s forum selection clause, the Court of Appeal also violated the federal constitutional prohibition against the extraterritorial application of State law and common-law principles of comity.

As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized long ago, “[n]o State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.” _Bonaparte v. Tax Court_, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). Breaches of State territorial limitations raise grave concerns for the Union: “[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of [one State] to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends.” _New York

In the present case, the Court of Appeal was effectively without jurisdiction to opine on New York’s policy of enforcing pre-dispute jury trial waivers. Both parties had agreed by contract that their dispute was to be litigated in New York under New York law. The court’s refusal to abide by that limitation meant that a California court overrode the policy choices of a sister State.

Moreover, the decision below fails to respect basic principles of comity and full faith and credit. Those principles compel the courts of one State to respect the proper application of another State’s laws. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1283 (2016) (explaining “that, in devising a special—and hostile—rule for California, Nevada has not ‘sensitively applied principles of comity with a healthy regard for California’s sovereign status’”).

* * * * *

This Court need not allow the Court of Appeal’s dubious decision to stand as precedent. Under California Rule of Court 8.1105, the “Supreme Court may order that an opinion certified for publication is not to be published,” and “may also order depublication of part of an opinion at any time after granting review.”

Here, the Court should order depublication of the decision of the Court of Appeal. Such a course is warranted. The holding reached by the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District is highly dubious, and it calls into doubt the validity of thousands—if not millions—of contracts.

Very truly yours,

Tami Kameda Sims

Tami Kameda Sims

CC: Attached Service List
PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am employed with the law firm of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, whose address is 2029 Century Park East, Suite 2600, Los Angeles, CA 90067-3012. I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to the within action.

On June 30, 2020, I served the foregoing document described as: Letter of Amici Curiae Requesting Depublication of the Lower Court Opinion in Handoush v. Lease Finance Group LLC, No. S259523 (Cal.) on the parties in this action by serving:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY E-SERVICE VIA TRUEFILING: All participants in this case who are registered TrueFiling users will be served by the TrueFiling system.

BY MAIL: As follows: I am “readily familiar” with this firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with United States Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than 1 day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

Executed on June 30, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

/s/ Tami K. Sims
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4 Copies
ATTACHMENT
THE STATE OF NEW YORK vs. NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC.

Supreme Court of New York, New York County

May 29, 2020, Decided

450460/2016

REPORTER
2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2564 *

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State of New York, and GEORGE J. SILVER, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for New York City Courts, Petitioners - against - NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC., LEASE FINANCE GROUP LLC, MBF LEASING LLC, LEASE SOURCE-LSI, LLC a/k/a LEASE SOURCE, INC., GOLDEN EAGLE LEASING LLC, PUSHPIN HOLDINGS LLC, JAY COHEN a/k/a ARI JAY COHEN, individually, as a principal of NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC., as a member of LEASE FINANCE GROUP LLC, and as an officer of PUSHPIN HOLDINGS LLC, NEIL HERTZMAN, individually and as an officer of NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC., JOSEPH I. SUSSMAN, P.C., JOSEPH I. SUSSMAN, individually and as a principal of JOSEPH I. SUSSMAN, P.C., and ELIYAHU R. BABAD, individually and as a principal or associate of JOSEPH I. SUSSMAN, P.C., Respondents. Index No. 450460/2016


Judges: LUCY BILLINGS, J.S.C.

Opinion by: LUCY BILLINGS

DECISION AND ORDER

LUCY BILLINGS, J.S.C.: I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner James, New York Attorney General, sues
Pursuant to New York Executive Law § 63(12) for respondents' fraud and other illegal conduct in leasing equipment. The lessors are respondents Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., Lease Finance Group LLC, MBF Leasing LLC, Lease Source-LSI, LLC, Golden Eagle Leasing LLC, and Pushpin Holdings (Northern Leasing respondents). Respondents Cohen and Hertzman are officers of the Northern Leasing [*2] respondents. Respondents Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., Sussman, and Babad (attorney respondents) enforced the leases through litigation. Petitioner James also seeks dissolution of Northern Leasing, Inc., based on its fraud and illegal conduct. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law (BCL) § 1101(a)(2). Petitioner Judge Silver seeks to vacate the default judgments respondents have obtained in actions to enforce the equipment leases. C.P.L.R. § 5015(c).

Petitioners move for a judgment for the relief sought in their petition based on the supporting evidence presented. C.P.L.R. § 409(b). Respondents move for a judgment dismissing the claims against them, id., or, to the extent that petitioners' claims are not dismissed, for a trial on the surviving claims, C.P.L.R. § 410, and for pre-trial disclosure. C.P.L.R. § 408.

II. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

A. LESSEES' AND THEIR GUARANTORS' COMPLAINTS

Petitioners present 873 affidavits by equipment lessees or their guarantors complaining about the Northern Leasing respondents and the salespersons through whom the Northern Leasing respondents' leases were entered. The disputes arose from equipment finance leases (EFLs) of point of sale credit card processing equipment, of check reading machines, and of signs. While the affidavits recount the salespersons' [*3] misrepresentations to the lessees and guarantors, since those statements are not offered for their truth, they are not hearsay. People v. Patterson, 28 N.Y.3d 544, 549, 46 N.Y.S.3d 511, 68 N.E.3d 1242 (2016); People v. Becoats, 17 N.Y.3d 643, 655, 958 N.E.2d 865, 934 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2011); People v. Bautista, 132 A.D.3d 523, 525, 18 N.Y.S.3d 47 (1st Dep't 2015), aff'd, 30 N.Y.3d 935, 66 N.Y.S.3d 146, 88 N.E.3d 304 (2017); Bruckmann, Rosser, Sherrill & Co., L.P. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 87 A.D.3d 65, 68 n.*, 926 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1st Dep't 2011).

Lessees attest that they signed an EFL on a single page and later received additional pages with their signatures on them or an EFL with terms different than the salespersons described. Salespersons failed to leave a copy of the signed EFL with lessees and informed them that they were signing credit applications or price quotation documents. Lessees reported not receiving a copy of the EFL even after requesting one or receiving copies (1) that were illegible due to poor facsimile quality or small print, (2) only after requesting a copy from the Northern Leasing respondents, or (3) after the renegotiation or cancellation period expired.

Most lessees believed they were purchasing credit card processing services, renewing those services at a better rate, or upgrading or replacing current equipment and were completely unaware of entering any agreement with the Northern Leasing respondents. Salespersons represented to lessees that the EFL was required for lower rates on credit card processing services.

Lessees complained of not [*4] receiving equipment or receiving equipment that was not the type they had agreed to, did not function, or ceased functioning, which the salespersons failed to remedy. Many lessees further complained of paying thousands of dollars for equipment that costs only hundreds of dollars and of the Northern Leasing respondents charging for equipment that was inoperative or obsolete or that the lessees never received, never used, or returned, charges that continued years after the EFL expired or the lessee's business was sold or closed.

Lessees reported forgery, fraud, or misrepresentation to the Northern Leasing respondents without a response, even though the lessees completed the affidavits that the Northern Leasing respondents required, and complained that they ignored inquiries into the debts owed. The Northern Leasing respondents attempted to collect the claimed debts from guarantors who were not owners of the business for which the equipment was leased, but were employees, volunteer workers, visitors, or identity theft victims with no connection to the business.

Regarding the collection actions commenced to enforce the EFLs and the resulting default judgments, many lessees and guarantors [*5] attest that they never received notice of the action or that it was commenced many years after the EFL expired. Most of the lessees and guarantors, most of whom did not reside in New York, attest that defending the action in New York was cost prohibitive. Lessees and guarantors further complained that the Northern Leasing respondents made excessive demands for payment via written correspondence and via telephone, threatened to collect
from family members or report the lessees and guarantors to credit reporting agencies, and actually made such reports.

B. THE NORTHERN LEASING RESPONDENTS’ LEASE PROCEDURES

According to Cohen, Northern Leasing Systems’ founder and chief executive officer, the Northern Leasing respondents’ business is to finance leases of equipment. Four parties are involved in the EFLs that the Northern Leasing respondents finance: the merchant-lessees, the personal guarantors, independent sales organizations (ISOs), and the lessors, the Northern Leasing respondents. The Northern Leasing respondents, which employ no salespersons, rely on the ISOs to secure EFL applications from lessees. Typically, the ISOs sell credit card processing services on a bank’s behalf. The ISOs [*6] acquire, deliver, and install the equipment for the lessees. After the lessee and guarantor sign the EFL application, the ISOs present it to the Northern Leasing respondents with a voided check to allow for automatic debits of the monthly EFL payments. The Northern Leasing respondents verify the EFL application through a credit report. The signed EFL applications become EFLs only when the Northern Leasing respondents sign them. After the Northern Leasing respondents approve an EFL, they pay the ISO the full amount of the EFL, and the ISO transfers title of the equipment to the Northern Leasing respondents, which then sign the EFL.

C. WHETHER A TRIAL IS REQUIRED

In a special proceeding such as this one: “If triable issues of fact are raised they shall be tried forthwith and the court shall make a final determination thereon.” C.P.L.R. § 410; Matter of Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. (Elan Pharmas., Inc.), 10 A.D.3d 331, 334, 781 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1st Dep’t 2004). See People ex rel. Robertson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 67 N.Y.2d 197, 202, 492 N.E.2d 762, 501 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1986). The Northern Leasing respondents' first line of defense is to deny liability for any ISO's misconduct, claiming that the factual record establishes the absence of an agency relationship between them and any ISO. For all their defenses, the Northern Leasing respondents rely on their business records. Oksana Arkhipova, Northern Leasing Systems’ director of [*7] information technology, lays a business record foundation for the admissibility of their records regarding 136 merchants, including transcripts of the Northern Leasing respondents’ verification telephone calls to lessees, their “welcome letters” to lessees, equipment delivery and acceptance receipts, and logs confirming lessees’ payments. Aff. of Oksana Arkhipova ¶¶ 12-146 (Apr. 5, 2019). See C.P.L.R. § 4518(a). The Northern Leasing respondents maintain that their verification telephone calls and welcome letters and the equipment delivery and acceptance receipts confirm execution and receipt of the EFL, its terms, and receipt of functioning equipment and, together with their logs confirming lessees’ payments, belie the lessees’ complaints.

The transcripts of recorded verification telephone conversations with lessees on which the Northern Leasing respondents rely to refute the lessees’ complaints, however, are certified by the transcriber as an accurate transcription of the recording, but lack any foundation for the authenticity of the recording transcribed. Neither participant in the recorded conversation attests that the recording is a fair and accurate reproduction of the conversation. Grucci v. Grucci, 20 N.Y.3d 893, 897, 981 N.E.2d 248, 957 N.Y.S.2d 652 (2012); People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d 520, 527, 503 N.E.2d 88, 510 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1986). See People v. Dicks, 100 A.D.3d 528, 528, 954 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep’t 2012). The [*8] transcript does not even identify the Northern Leasing respondents’ participant.

Even if the court considers the recorded conversations, the Northern Leasing respondents do not show that these conversations occur with any regularity. Arkhipova admits that the Northern Leasing respondents telephoned only about 15% of lessees since 2010. Aff. of Oksana Arkhipova ¶ 19 (June 14, 2018).

The Northern Leasing respondents further contend that, within 10 days after they sign an EFL, they send their welcome letter confirming the EFL’s terms, accompanied by a signed copy of the EFL. No witness attests to the Northern Leasing respondents’ regular mailing procedures, however, to establish the welcome letters’ transmission. *Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Zaidman*, 107 A.D.3d 579, 580, 969 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1st Dep’t 2013); *Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Ray & Frank Liq. Store, Inc.*, 104 A.D.3d 482, 483, 960 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep’t 2013); *People v. Torres*, 99 A.D.3d 429, 430, 951 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep’t 2012).

The Northern Leasing respondents’ “comment logs” include “contemporaneous notes of each event involving the EFL, such as telephone calls [*10]* made and received, letters sent and received, credit inquiries, payments made and payments that were rejected by a bank.” *Arkhipova Aff. ¶ 10* (Apr. 5, 2019). Since no witness explains the meaning of the entries in the comment logs, which are not self-explanatory, the comment logs lack the probative value necessary for their admissibility. *People v. Mingo*, 12 N.Y.3d 563, 757-76, 910 N.E.2d 983, 883 N.Y.S.2d 154 (2009). Even if the comment logs established lessees’ regular payments under the EFLs without objection, the payments do not amount to admissions that no forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, or deficient equipment was involved in the transaction as the Northern Leasing respondents’ contend, because the monthly payments are automatically debited from the lessees’ accounts.

Finally, the affidavits by Cohen and Ron Kinchloe, Northern Leasing Systems’ president, regarding the Northern Leasing respondents’ procedures for customer service and investigation of forgery, fraud, and misrepresentation claims, without more, do not establish that the Northern Leasing respondents’ employees followed those procedures. *Singh v. Citibank*, N.A., 136 A.D.3d 521, 521, 24 N.Y.S.3d 649 (1st Dep’t 2016); *Massilo v. On Stage, Ltd.*, 83 A.D.3d 74, 80, 921 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep’t 2011); *Dones v. New York City Hous. Auth.*, 81 A.D.3d 554, 554, 917 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep’t 2011); *Dorsey v. Les Sans Culottes*, 43 A.D.3d 261, 261, 842 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1st Dep’t 2007). Most significantly, the Northern Leasing respondents present no affidavit or deposition testimony by any ISOs’ employees to rebut the lessees’ consistent [*11]* accounts. Nor does Cohen, while attesting to procedures for screening applicants to become ISOs, attest to any procedure for verifying through the ISOs that they present validly executed EFL applications.


III. CLAIMS UNDER EXECUTIVE LAW § 63(12)
Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages.


**A. THE INDEPENDENT SALES ORGANIZATIONS’ CONDUCT**

Petitioners’ claims against the Northern Leasing respondents depend to an extent on the ISOs’ authority to act for them. The parties dispute whether the ISOs had actual or apparent authority and whether the Northern Leasing respondents ratified the ISOs' unauthorized conduct.

1. The Absence of an Agency Relationship


Petitioners contend that the Northern Leasing respondents control the ISOS by requiring them to apply to sell EFLs, providing the EFL forms, training the ISOS to sell EFLs, providing the EFL forms, training the ISOS to sell EFLs, paying them commissions for completed EFLs, and paying commissions to EFLs. When ISOS engage in forgery, fraud, or deceptive conduct, the Northern Leasing respondents refuse to purchase EFLs and charge rejected EFLs back to the ISOS. The Northern Leasing respondents maintain that the documentary evidence demonstrates the absence of ISOS’ authority or an employment or affiliation between them. *New York Community Bank v. Woodhaven Assoc.*, 137 A.D.3d 1231, 1233, 29 N.Y.S.3d 377 (2d Dep’t 2016); *Alves v. Petik*, 136 A.D.3d 426, 426, 23 N.Y.S.3d 883 (1st Dep’t 2016); *Chaouni v. Ali*, 105 A.D.3d 424, 425, 963 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2013); *Bizjak v. Gramercy Capital Corp.*, 95 A.D.3d 469, 470, 944 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep’t 2012).

Petitioners also contend that the Northern Leasing respondents trained the ISOS to make representations or to sign documents on the Northern Leasing respondents’ behalf. The Northern Leasing respondents further maintain that, even if they exercised control as petitioners contend, petitioners fail to demonstrate that the Northern Leasing respondents trained the ISOS to make misrepresentations, alter EFLs after they are signed, or forge signatures.

In fact, the Northern Leasing respondents' total absence from the execution of EFL applications by ISOs and merchants indicates the lack of any close supervisory control. Goodwin v. Comcast Corp., 42 A.D.3d 322, 323, 840 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1st Dep't 2007). The express agreement between the Northern Leasing respondents and the ISOs that they are not principals and agents, Quik Park W. 57 LLC v. Bridgewater Operating Corp., 148 A.D.3d at 445; Zeng Ji Liu v. Bathily, 145 A.D.3d at 558-59, as well as the EFLs' provision to the same effect, and the Northern Leasing respondents' commissions to ISOs for completed EFL applications further evince an independent contractor relationship. Matter of Ted Is Back Corp. (Roberts), 64 N.Y.2d 725, 726, 475 N.E.2d 113, 485 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1984); Bizjak v. Gramercy Capital Corp., 95 A.D.3d at 470.

2. The Absence of Apparent Authority


3. Ratification Is Inapplicable.

Had petitioners shown that the Northern Leasing respondents exercised control over the ISOs so as to render them agents, but not shown that the Northern Leasing respondents instructed the ISOs to make misrepresentations, alter EFLs after execution, or forge signatures, then petitioners might establish the principals' liability through their ratification of the agents' acts. The principals' knowledge of their agents' fraudulent acts and acceptance the benefits of those acts, even if previously unauthorized, will establish ratification. Standard Funding Corp. v. Lewitt, 89 N.Y.2d at 552; New York State Medical Transporters Ass'n v. Perales, 77 N.Y.2d 126, 131, 566 N.E.2d 134, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1990); La Candelaria E. Harlem Community Ctr., Inc. v. First Am. Tit. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 146 A.D.3d 473, 473, 46 N.Y.S.3d 252 (1st Dep't 2016). SeeCashel v. Cashel, 15 N.Y.3d 794, 796, 934 N.E.2d 876, 908 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010). Even though the ISOs' misrepresentation, [*16] fraud, or forgery might not be readily apparent simply from the EFLs that the ISOs present to the Northern Leasing respondents, petitioners do show, as set forth below, the Northern

B. THE NORTHERN LEASING RESPONDENTS' OWN CONDUCT

It is the Northern Leasing respondents' very hands-off attitude toward the ISOs, however, that inculpates the Northern Leasing respondents and thus is their undoing.

1. The Equipment Finance Leases

The parties do not dispute that the Northern Leasing respondents drafted their EFLs, which petitioners contend are unconscionable. An unconscionable contract requires a showing that when the contract was entered it was both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. Lawrence v. Graubard Miller, 11 N.Y.3d 588, 595, 901 N.E.2d 1268, 873 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2008); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 534 N.E.2d 824, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1988); Ortega v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., 156 A.D.3d 580, 580, 65 N.Y.S.3d 693 (1st Dep't 2017); Green v. 119 W. 138th St. LLC, 142 A.D.3d 805, 808, 37 N.Y.S.3d 491 (1st Dep't 2016). Procedural unconscionability relates to the circumstances of a contract's formation and encompasses the use of high pressured tactics or deception; the contract's legibility; the education, experience, and language ability of the party claiming unconscionability; and the disparity of bargaining power. Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.2d at 11; State v. Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 390, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980); Green v. 119 W. 138th St. LLC, 142 A.D.3d at 809; Daniel. Inc. v. First Paradise Theaters Corp., 99 A.D.3d 517, 520, 952 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1st Dep't 2012). Since petitioners' claims of procedural unconscionability arise from the ISOs' actions, petitioners do not establish the Northern Leasing respondents' liability for any procedural unconscionability. Thus, even if petitioners establish that the EFLs are substantively unconscionable, without the procedural unconscionability, petitioners will not establish the EFLs' unconscionability.

2. Processing the Lease Applications


Against this backdrop, the Northern Leasing respondents' enforcement of their EFLs constitutes repeated and persistent fraud under Executive Law § 63(12) because their chosen method of procuring EFLs both is deceptive in itself and has created an enterprise conducive to fraud. All the lessees' affidavits attest to ISOs' misrepresentations of credit card processing rates; that leasing the equipment is necessary to obtain lower processing rates; and promising the ISOs' delivery, installation, or repair of the equipment, a trial period for the equipment, and that the EFL or the service is cancelable. Materially misleading representations violate Executive Law § 63(12); People v. Orbital Publ. Group, Inc., 169 A.D.3d 564, 565, 95 N.Y.S.3d 28 (1st Dep't 2019). Wilful oral misrepresentations in particular constitute fraud under § 63(12); State of New York v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d at 87.

Many lessees also deny signing EFLs and claim that the EFLs bearing their signatures are forgeries. The Northern Leasing respondents capitalize on the ISOs' oral misrepresentations by processing EFL applications without proving the EFLs' valid execution by admissible,
reliable evidence and lock lessees into EFLs that automatically renew in perpetuity and may not be cancelled, for services of extremely questionable value. The lessees receive no warranty from the [\*19] ISO or the equipment manufacturer to permit the Northern Leasing respondents, as equipment finance lessors, to use their noncancellation provision. \textit{N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-A-103(1)(q).} See \textit{Canon Fin. Servs. v. Medico Stationary Serv.}, 300 A.D.2d 66, 67, 751 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 2002). When lessees attempt to return inoperative equipment, the ISO to which they would return the equipment has disappeared. Even when lessees do return equipment, the Northern Leasing respondents deny that the leased equipment was returned and continue to charge the lessees for it.

Cohen attests that the Northern Leasing respondents will charge back to the ISOs EFLs found to be the product of forgery, fraud, or misrepresentation, cease collecting payments under the EFL, and cancel it. Arkhipova attests, however, that these instances are in less than 0.3% of EFLs. Arkhipova Aff. ¶¶ 15-16 (June 14, 2018). In any event, in none of these instances does Cohen attest that the Northern Leasing respondents refund already collected payments to the lessees or cease conducting business through the offending ISO. The Northern Leasing respondents’ failure to oversee the ISOs and to assess any meaningful penalty against them for presenting a fraudulent EFL has created an enterprise conducive to fraud. The forgeries, material misrepresentations, [\*20] and non-cancelable EFLs even when the leased equipment is never delivered, does not function, or is returned would never occur but for the Northern Leasing respondents creating their market for the ISOs, through their commissions, and then washing their hands of the ISOs’ conduct. Given the number of lessees’ complaints about similar ISO misconduct, the Northern Leasing respondents were on notice that securing EFLs through the ISOs was conducive to fraud. See \textit{Chapman v. Silber}, 97 N.Y.2d 9, 21-22, 760 N.E.2d 329, 734 N.Y.S.2d 541 (2001); \textit{Berenger v. 261 West LLC}, 93 A.D.3d 175, 182, 940 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1st Dep't 2012). That knowledge sustains petitioners’ fraud claim. \textit{IKB Intern. S.A. v. Morgan Stanley}, 142 A.D.3d 447, 450, 36 N.Y.S.3d 452 (1st Dep't 2016); \textit{AIG Fin. Prods. Corp. v. ICP Asset Mgt., LLC}, 108 A.D.3d 444, 446, 969 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1st Dep't 2014).

More fundamentally, it is difficult to discern the "service" that the Northern Leasing respondents claim to provide by financing equipment worth a few hundred dollars for thousands of dollars over several years. The Northern Leasing respondents retain title to the equipment, but disclaim any warranty of the equipment, require the lessees to insure it, and leave responsibility for repairing or replacing defective equipment to the ISOs over which the Northern Leasing respondents retain no control.

To be sure, lessees’ admissions to signing contract documents without reading or understanding them or signing blank contract documents do not excuse their obligation to perform under [\*21] those contracts. \textit{Suttongate Holdings Ltd. v. Lacomn Mgt. N.V.}, 173 A.D.3d 618, 620, 106 N.Y.S.3d 1 (1st Dep't 2019); \textit{Jin-Rong Yu v. 2030 Embassy LLC}, 83 A.D.3d 562, 563, 922 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1st Dep't 2011); \textit{Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc.}, 74 A.D.3d 420, 423, 904 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2010); \textit{Martin v. Citibank N.A.}, 64 A.D.3d 477, 477, 883 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dep't 2009). The lessees who admitted to these failures, however, account for only a small number of the lessees who present complaints. Contrary to the Northern Leasing respondents’ contention, even a small fraction of the total number of complaints presented would sustain a claim under \textit{Executive Law § 63(12). State of New York v. Princess Prestige Co.}, 42 N.Y.2d 104, 107, 366 N.E.2d 61, 397 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1977). Petitioners need not prove a high percentage of violations among all the lease transactions. Id. (0.44 is enough).

Moreover, lessees’ failure to read or understand contract documents or their execution of blank contract documents does not excuse misrepresentations of the documents’ contents or meaning or alterations in the documents after they were signed, even if the oral misrepresentations are not binding and the written contract remains binding. Nor is it binding if it was fraudulently induced by misrepresentations beyond its terms, such as the functionality of the equipment or the costs it saved. \textit{DDJ Mgt., LLC v. Rhone Group L.L.C.}, 15 N.Y.3d 147, 154, 931 N.E.2d 87, 905 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2010); \textit{Knox, LLC v. Lakian}, 182 A.D.3d 466, 467 (1st Dep't 2020); \textit{PF2 Sec. Evaluations, Inc. v. Fillebeen}, 171 A.D.3d 551, 553, 98 N.Y.S.3d 162 (1st Dep't 2019); \textit{Ohm NYC LLC v. Times Sq. Assoc. LLC}, 170 A.D.3d 534, 534, 96 N.Y.S.3d 198 (1st Dep't 2019).

3. Enforcing the Leases

The EFLs' provisions permitting service of legal process through means unlikely to give notice and selecting the New York City Civil Court in New York County (New York County Civil Court) as the forum for disputes, discouraging participation in the litigation, [\*22] allow the Northern Leasing respondents to secure judgments by the easiest means possible. The sample EFLs that...
the Northern Leasing respondents present allow service of process on the lessees and guarantors by certified mail to the address listed on the EFL or the "current or last known address at the time of suit." Aff. of Jay Cohen (June 14, 2018) Ex. 1-1 at 2, 5, Ex. 1-2, at 1-2, Ex. 1-3, at 1, 4, Ex. 1-4, at 2, 5, Ex. 1-5, at 2, 5, Ex. 1-6, at 1, 4, Ex. 1-7, at 1-2, Ex. 1-8, at 1-2, Ex. 1-9, at 2, 4, Ex. 1-10, at 2, 4, Ex. 1-11, at 2, 5, Ex. 1-12, at 2, 4, Ex. 1-13, at 1-2, Ex. 1-14 at 2, 4. Alternate service, even if contractually permitted, still must be reasonably calculated to provide notice. See Mestecky v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d 239, 246, 66 N.Y.S.3d 207, 88 N.E.3d 365 (2017); Matter of Orange County Commr. of Fin. (Helseth), 18 N.Y.3d 634, 639, 965 N.E.2d 944, 942 N.Y.S.2d 442 (2012); Ruffin v. Lion Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 578, 582, 940 N.E.2d 909, 915 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2010); Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 789 N.E.2d 607, 759 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2003). Service at the address on the EFL, entered many years earlier, or the last known address, which may be equally obsolete, does not ensure service to a valid, current address and thus is not reasonably calculated to provide the required notice. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many lessees and guarantors attest to complete unawareness of a dispute before litigation was commenced, unawareness of the litigation when it was commenced, and unawareness of the litigation until after a default [*23] judgment was entered against them.

The EFL and its guaranty do not advise lessees or guarantors to update their addresses on the EFL. Nor would a lessee or guarantor discern any reason to do so after the lease term has expired or the equipment has been returned. Yet respondents typically do not commence litigation until after that point. To the extent that respondents rely on a last known address, this provision is impossible to enforce, particularly when the expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that the defendants must raise to bar an action. Given the number of lessees and guarantors who reported not receiving notice of Northern Leasing respondents' collection actions against these defendants [*24] until after a judgment was entered against them, an affirmative defense offers no remedy. Even if raised as a basis to vacate a judgment, the defense will be effective only if the lessees and guarantors establish a reasonable excuse for defaulting by showing the absence of notice. Caesar v. Harlem USA Stores, Inc., 150 A.D.3d 524, 524, 55 N.Y.S.3d 25 (1st Dep't 2017); Melinda M. v. Anthony J.H., 143 A.D.3d 617, 619, 41 N.Y.S.3d 15 (1st Dep't 2016).

The EFLs' provision designating New York County Civil Court as the exclusive forum for litigating disputes further combines with the fraud in procuring the EFLs and the ineffective service provisions to thwart lessees' and guarantors' ability to defend the Northern Leasing respondents' actions. Yoshida v. PC Tech U.S.A. & You-Ri, Inc., 22 A.D.3d 373, 373, 803 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't 2005). See GE Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Turbine Generation Servs., L.L.C., 140 A.D.3d 582, 583, 35 N.Y.S.3d 311 (1st Dep't 2016); Camacho v. IO Practiceware, Inc., 136 A.D.3d 415, 416, 24 N.Y.S.3d 279 (1st Dep't 2016); Public Adm'r Bronx County v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 A.D.3d at 621; Sterling Natl. Bank v. Eastern Shipping Worldwide, Inc., 35 A.D.3d 222, 222, 826 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1st Dep't 2006). According to Northern Leasing Systems' Vice President of Sales Richard Hahn, the average total payments due under their EFLs in 2014 was $2,400.00, without interest or fees, but also without deducting any payments made. Even if a lessee or guarantor owes nothing, the cost to defend against such an amount in a faraway forum is more than amount that the Northern Leasing respondents typically are claiming. It is less costly to allow a default judgment to be entered or to acquiesce to a settlement that is not owed.

Conspicuously, respondents present no evidence to contradict the difficulty and prohibitive [*25] cost of litigation in New York for any defendant who does not reside here. Nor do the Northern Leasing respondents present any evidence that it is unduly burdensome for them to prosecute their actions in forums where the defendants reside or conduct business.

4. Liability of Cohen and Hertzman

Cohen and Neil Hertzman, Northern Leasing Systems' Vice President of Customer Service and Collections, as

Cohen, of course, did submit [*26] an affidavit laying out the Northern Leasing respondents' procedures for investigating forgery, fraud, and misrepresentation claims, without proving by admissible, reliable evidence any procedure for verifying that ISOs present validly executed EFL applications. Cohen lays out the Northern Leasing respondents' procedure for charging back to the ISOs EFLs found to be the product of forgery, fraud, or misrepresentation, ceasing the collection of payments under the EFL, and cancelling it, without any procedure for refunding already collected payments to the lessees or ceasing business with the offending ISO. Therefore he is unquestionably aware that the Northern Leasing respondents have failed to oversee the ISOs and assess any meaningful penalty against them for presenting a fraudulent EFL and thus have created an enterprise conducive to fraud. In sum, both corporate officers, Cohen and Hertzman, are liable for the Northern Leasing respondents' fraud.

5. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine


The Northern Leasing respondents contend that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects their EFL enforcement activities and bar all petitioners' claims. Petitioners counter that the Northern Leasing respondents' conduct falls under the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.


Although in the context of respondents' motion to dismiss the petition, the Appellate Division offers guidance on this issue. "The allegations that the Northern Respondents created legal obligations through
misrepresentations and fraud, and then attempted to enforce those obligations through abusive pre-litigation and litigation practices sufficiently demonstrate [*28] that the Northern Respondents' debt-collection activities and procuring of default judgments were 'objectively baseless.'” People v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 169 A.D.3d at 530. This court now has found that the Northern Leasing respondents have chosen methods for procuring EFLs that have created an enterprise conducive to fraud; by the sheer numbers of complaints, are charged with knowledge of the ISOs' persistent misconduct; and have ignored or overlooked such conduct. By the Appellate Division's standard, the Northern Leasing respondents' debt collection activities, through threats to injure credit ratings and to pursue litigation and through actual pursuit of litigation, resulting in a high rate of default judgments, render those activities objectively baseless.

To the extent that the Northern Leasing respondents achieved victory in court due to default judgments, the design and effect of the EFL provisions allowing service by mail to obsolete addresses and designating New York County Civil Court as the forum for litigation are to avoid notice and deprive lessees and guarantors of their day in court to defend against the EFLs. Yoshida v. PC Tech U.S.A. & You-Ri, Inc., 22 A.D.3d at 373. See GE Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Turbine Generation Servs., L.L.C., 140 A.D.3d at 583; Camacho v. IO Practiceware, Inc., 136 A.D.3d at 416; Public Adm'r Bronx County v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 A.D.3d at 621; Sterling Natl. Bank v. Eastern Shipping Worldwide, Inc., 35 A.D.3d at 222.

The service and forum selection provisions and the fraud used to procure the EFLs in the first [*29] instance thus demonstrate repeated and persistent fraud, deceit, and deprivation of rights establishing the sham exception. See I.G. Second Generation Partners, L.P. v. Duane Reade, 17 A.D.3d at 208.

In contrast to the high rate of default judgments in the litigation to enforce the EFLs, the Northern Leasing respondents point to the small fraction of lessees' complaints out of the total EFL transactions and maintain that this low rate of complaints demonstrates overwhelming customer satisfaction. This theory assumes that petitioners' 873 complainants are the entire universe of complainants and that every customer who has not presented an affidavit is satisfied. The Northern Leasing respondents themselves admit that over one third of their EFLs are in default, a statistic inconsistent with a high rate of customer satisfaction. Even those customers who continue to pay under the EFLs may be paying only because the payments are automatically withdrawn from their bank accounts, and the customers cannot stop the withdrawals without closing their account altogether.

The number of satisfied customers, in any event, is irrelevant to the fraud that the Northern Leasing respondents committed, even if in a small fraction of transactions, and the baselessness of any [*30] activity to enforce a fraudulent transaction. People v. Codina, 110 A.D.3d 401, 408, 972 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1st Dep't 2013). As set forth above, the number of complaints still amounts to repeated and persistent fraud. State of New York v. Princess Prestige Co., 42 N.Y.2d at 107. By the Appellate Division's standard, the sham exception applies to any of the Northern Leasing respondents' threatening debt collection activities, including litigation, that takes advantage of defendants' lack of notice or inability to travel to New York or hire an attorney in New York, resulting in a high rate of default judgments or pressured settlements. People v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 169 A.D.3d at 530. In this context, the standard does not require any series or pattern of such conduct.

Finally, the Northern Leasing respondents present New York City Civil Court orders denying lessees' or guarantors' motions to vacate default judgments or to answer late or granting Northern Leasing respondents' motions for summary judgment and thus upholding the EFL terms regarding the guaranty, service of process, and forum selection. These decisions do not bind this court. Moreover, when EFL provisions are upheld in the context of an individual transaction, the decision may be based simply on the recognized principle that the failure to read the EFL does not constitute a defense to the contract. The [*31] decision may not consider the combined effect of the fraudulent methods used to procure the EFL, without oversight, and of the onerous EFL provisions that supports the Executive Law § 63(12) claims. Again, lessees’ or guarantors’ failure to read or understand the EFL or guaranty or their execution of blank documents may not constitute a defense to the documents' terms, but does not excuse misrepresentations of the documents' contents or meaning, alterations in the documents after they were signed, or abusive debt collection and litigation.

IV. THE ATTORNEY RESPONDENTS' CONDUCT

Petitioners claim the attorney respondents are liable under Executive Law § 63(12) due to their long-standing representation of the Northern Leasing respondents in enforcing fraudulently procured EFLs. Petitioners focus
on the attorney respondents' abuse of the litigation process by pressuring lessees and guarantors into settlement, using a means of service not reasonably calculated to provide notice, suing in a forum far from defendants' residence or business, and aggressively using post-judgment collection remedies. Petitioners maintain that the attorney respondents' conduct also falls under the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The attorney [*32] respondents counter that Noerr-Pennington protects their litigation activities, that they are not liable because they are not parties to the EFLs or the judgments obtained, that they have no reason to believe that Northern Leasing respondents engaged in fraud, and that Babad is not liable because he is an employee of Sussman or his firm.

Again, as in analyzing the Northern Leasing respondents' liability under Executive Law § 63(12), albeit in the context of respondents' motion to dismiss the petition, the Appellate Division provides guidance.

The allegations that the Attorney Respondents continually engaged in a large-scale practice of bringing debt actions against numerous lessees and guarantors across a span of years, despite being aware of the same defenses raised by the lessees against the Northern Respondents, including fraud and misrepresentations, sufficiently allege that the Attorney Respondents knew that their litigation-related conduct was objectively baseless.


Regarding the attorney respondents' pre-litigation conduct, petitioners specifically target the attorney respondents' demand letters that deceptively inflate the demand by including attorneys' fees. Regarding the attorney respondents' litigation, [*33] petitioners first present the affidavit of Eddy Valdez, Deputy Chief Clerk of the New York City Civil Court, sworn to March 28, 2016, attesting that from 2010 to 2015, Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., filed 30,768 actions on behalf of the Northern Leasing respondents in New York County Civil Court. The Northern Leasing respondents obtained 10,204 default judgments in their actions, which constituted over 4096 of the total default judgments entered in actions in New York County Civil Court, exclusive of landlord-tenant proceedings. [*34] Only 297 motions to vacate default judgments were filed in 2016 and 2017.

The attorney respondents first contend that they did not commit fraud or deception in representing the Northern Leasing respondents because the Northern Leasing respondents did not commit fraud or deception. To support this proposition, the attorney respondents rely on the inadmissible verification call transcripts, Grucci v. Grucci, 20 N.Y.3d at 897; People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d at 527; and delivery and acceptance receipts. Clarke v. American Truck & Trailer, Inc., 171 A.D.3d at 408; B & H Florida Notes LLC v. Ashkenazi, 149 A.D.3d at 403 n.2; AQ Asset Mgt. LLC v. Levine, 128 A.D.3d at 621; IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A. v. Portobello Intl. Ltd., 84 A.D.3d at 637-38, to determine whether to prosecute actions against guarantors. As discussed above, these documents fail to support the absence of fraud or deception by the Northern Leasing respondents.

The evidence instead supports the attorney respondents' notice of the Northern Leasing respondents' fraud and deception under Executive Law § 63(12)'s standard. Sussman's deposition testimony October 12, 2010, that he participated in drafting versions of the EFLs, plus the sheer number of actions that the attorney respondents commenced on the Northern Leasing respondents' behalf charge them with knowledge of the Northern Leasing respondents' fraudulent practices in procuring the EFLs that the attorney respondents then seek to enforce. They prosecuted more than 71% of the actions that they commenced [*35] to default judgments. They also were well aware of the EFLs' mail service and forum selection provisions. From these facts it was obvious to the attorney respondents that lessees and guarantors were not participating in litigation due to the inadequate notice provided by mail service and the logistical difficulties posed by New York City Civil Court forum.

Sussman attests that, despite the EFLs' provision for mail service, the attorney respondents personally served guarantors pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 308 and only
began regularly serving process by certified mail as provided in the EFLs in 2013, as if the regular procedure since 2013 were insignificant. Appendix C to Sussman's affirmation also shows that the addresses listed in affidavits of service on 68 of 82 lessees or guarantors matched the address listed on documents that the parties served then filed with the Attorney General or the court. This miniscule sample does not account for the 14 of 82 addresses that did not match, let alone the tens of thousands of actions commenced by mail service beyond the 82, even if they yielded the same ratio of 14 out of 82 unmatching addresses.

These data demonstrate compliance neither with C.P.L.R. § 308 nor even with the [*36] EFLs' requirement that certified mail be sent to the address listed in the EFL or the "current or last known address at the time of suit." Most significantly, these data simply do not demonstrate that, when respondents do comply with the provision for certified mail to the address listed in the EFL or the "current or last known address at the time of suit," that method regularly gives notice to the addressee.

The attorney respondents address the service by mail provision and the forum selection provision separately and urge that the provisions are reasonable when considered separately. In so doing, the attorney respondents ignore these provisions' combined effect, particularly when considered with the fraudulent means by which the EFLs may have been executed, to avoid notice and deprive lessees and guarantors of their day in court. Yoshida v. PC Tech U.S.A. & You-Ri, Inc., 22 A.D.3d at 373. See GE Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Turbine Generation Servs., L.L.C., 140 A.D.3d at 583; Camacho v. IO Practiceware, Inc., 136 A.D.3d at 416; Public Adm'r Bronx County v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 A.D.3d at 621; Sterling Natl. Bank v. Eastern Shipping Worldwide, Inc., 35 A.D.3d at 222.

The claims by the attorney respondents that they recommended for trial only 484 of 2,692 cases flagged, occasionally recommend vacating default judgments or discontinuing actions voluntarily when guarantors raise defenses, and refrain from collecting attorneys' fees for default judgments because it is impractical fare no better. The actions that [*37] do proceed to default judgments arising from unsupervised fraud are still repeated and persistent. State of New York v. Princess Prestige Co., 42 N.Y.2d at 107. They do not include, moreover, the many actions that lessees and guarantors settled to stop harassing collection communications, to remove negative credit reports, or to avoid or end lawsuits and avoid entry of judgment.

Finally, the attorney respondents do not deny that Babad participated in their collection litigation. His status as an employee does not remove him from the application of Executive Law § 63(12). See People v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 169 A.D.3d at 531; People v. Greenberg, 21 N.Y.3d at 447.

V. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS OBTAINED BY FRAUD

Petitioner Judge Silver seeks to vacate the default judgments that respondents obtained in their actions to recover damages for breach of the EFLs.

An administrative judge, upon a showing that default judgments were obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, unconscionability, lack of due service, violations of law, or other illegalities or where such default judgments were obtained in cases in which those defendants would be uniformly entitled to interpose a defense predicated upon but not limited to the foregoing defenses, and where such default judgments have been obtained in a number deemed sufficient by him to justify such actions set [*38] forth herein, and upon appropriate notice to counsel for the respective parties, or to the parties themselves, may bring a proceeding to relieve a party or parties from them upon such terms as may be just.

C.P.L.R. § 5015(c). See Shaw v. Shaw, 97 A.D.2d 403, 404, 467 N.Y.S.2d 231 (2d Dep't 1983); Mead v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 60 A.D.2d 71, 74, 400 N.Y.S.2d 936 (4th Dep't 1977). This provision, formerly codified in New York Judiciary Law § 217-a, was designed to address the very circumstances now before the court. Shaw v. Shaw, 97 A.D.2d at 404; Mead v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 60 A.D.2d at 74.

As set forth above, respondents' use of the EFLs' mail service provision demonstrates that this form of notice to defendants of respondents' actions was ineffective, confirmed by lessees' and guarantors' accounts of nonreceipt or late receipt of notice of the action and by respondents' default judgments against lessees or guarantors in 71% of their actions from 2010 to 2017. Yoshida v. PC Tech U.S.A. & You-Ri, Inc., 22 A.D.3d at 373. See GE Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Turbine Generation Servs., L.L.C., 140 A.D.3d at 583; Camacho v. 10 Practiceware, Inc., 136 A.D.3d at 416; Public Adm'r Bronx County v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 A.D.3d at 621; Sterling Natl. Bank v. Eastern Shipping Worldwide, Inc.,
The Northern Leasing respondents contend that laches bar Judge Silver's claim. Laches is an equitable bar based on lengthy neglect in claiming a right that causes prejudice to another party. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d at 816; Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d at 130; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lam, 124 A.D.3d 430, 431, 2 N.Y.S.3d 87 (1st Dep't 2015); Matter of Linker, 23 A.D.3d at 189. They may show prejudice by a concrete injury, a changed position, lost evidence, or another disadvantage from the delay. Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d at 130; Matter of Linker, 23 A.D.3d at 189. The Northern Leasing respondents may not raise laches, however, as a defense against the State enforcing a public right or protecting a public interest. Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 23 N.Y.3d 631, 641-42, 992 N.Y.S.2d 469, 16 N.E.3d 527 (2014); Donn Gerelli Assoc. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lawsky, 151 A.D.3d 424, 425, 52 N.Y.S.3d 862 (1st Dep't 2017); State v. Astro Shuttle Arcades, 221 A.D.2d 198, 198, 633 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1st Dep't 2005).

Even if Judge Silver were not considered a State official, laches would not apply because Judge Silver and his predecessor, the original petitioner Judge Fisher, did not unreasonably or unfairly delay seeking to vacate the default judgments. Passage of time is necessary to justify actions to relieve a party or parties from judgments . . . obtained in a number deemed sufficient . . . to justify . . . actions to relieve a party or parties from them” require time to accumulate. C.P.L.R. § 5015(c). The Northern Leasing respondents' claimed prejudice of lost profits from years of acceptance of their practices by the New York County Civil Court is not cognizable prejudice, because that loss is the object of the very relief petitioners seek under § 5015(c).

Consequently, the 29,617 default judgment respondents "obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, [and] illegality” in the EFLs being enforced, followed by "lack of due service,” to the extent not already vacated, must be vacated. C.P.L.R. § 5015(c). Since the EFLs' provisions for lack of due service [*40] service and for suit in a cost prohibitive, faraway forum have generated these default judgments, the EFLs may not be enforced as written. Therefore the actions in which the default judgments are vacated also must be dismissed with prejudice.

To the extent that attorneys' fees are included in the amounts recovered based on these default judgments, the attorney respondents are liable along with their co-respondents under C.P.L.R. § 5015(c). See Mead v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 60 A.D.2d at 75. Lessees and guarantors present correspondence from the attorney respondents demanding payment and including attorneys’ fees along with the EFL payments and interest due in the total amount demanded.

VI. APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

Since petitioners' evidence supports the Northern Leasing respondents' liability for fraud under Executive Law § 63(12) and not under common law, the limitations period of three years applies to this claim. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); State of New York v. Daicel Chem. Indus. Ltd., 42 A.D.3d 301, 303, 840 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 2007). See Schneiderman v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 31 N.Y.3d 622, 634, 82 N.Y.S.3d 295, 107 N.E.3d 515 (2018); People v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 137 A.D.3d 409, 418, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66 (1st Dep't 2016).

No limitations period applies to petitioners' claim under C.P.L.R. § 5015(c). People v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 169 A.D.3d at 530.

VII. CORPORATE DISSOLUTION

As a final component of relief, petitioners seek to dissolve Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., 60 days after it pays the damages from all other claims.

The attorney-general may bring an action for the dissolution of a corporation upon one or more of the [*41] following grounds:....

(2) That the corporation has exceeded the authority conferred upon it by law, or has violated any provision of law whereby it has forfeited its charter, or carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner, or by the abuse of its powers contrary to the public policy of the state has become liable to be dissolved.

BCL § 1101(a) (emphasis added). See State of New York v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d at 87; People v. Oliver Schools, 206 A.D.2d 143, 145, 619 N.Y.S.2d 911 (4th Dep't 1994). "Section 1101 merely vests in the Attorney-General, or merely only codifies, his standing to
vindicate the State's right and provides for dissolution of the corporate abuser of the State's grant of corporate existence.” State of New York v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d at 88.

The court has rejected the Northern Leasing respondents' contentions that their conduct is legitimate because the EFLs of which lessees complain are only a small fraction of their total EFLs and that a trial is required on petitioners' claim for dissolution under BCL § 1101(a) as well as on their claim under Executive Law § 63(12). The court's finding that the Northern Leasing respondents committed persistent fraud under Executive Law § 63(12) necessarily also rejects the Northern Leasing respondents' contention that the lessees' complaints are business disputes that do not evince a public menace. Having established that respondents [*42] engaged in "persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business" in violation of Executive Law § 63(12), petitioners also have established that respondent Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., "carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner” under BCL § 1101(a)(2). See People v. Oliver Schools, 206 A.D.2d at 147.

VIII. DISPOSITION

In sum, petitioners have established their claim of fraud or illegality under Executive Law § 63(12) and their claim under C.P.L.R. § 5015(c) against all respondents and their claim under BCL § 1101(a)(2) against respondent Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. The court grants a judgment on the petition as follows, denies respondents a judgment dismissing the petition, denies the a trial on the petition, and denies their motion for a trial on the petition, and denies their motion for future motion for disclosure regarding restitution. C.P.L.R. §§ 408, 409(b), 410.


The court also awards disgorgement, a remedy under Executive Law § 63(12) distinct from restitution, requiring respondents' return of wrongfully obtained profits. People v. Greenberg, 27 N.Y.3d at 497; People v. Applied Card Sys., 11 N.Y.3d at 125; People v. Ernst & Young LLP, 114 A.D.3d 569, 569, 980 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1st Dep't 2014). While petitioners identify no such profit obtained by the Northern Leasing respondents, petitioners request and the court grants disgorgement by the attorney respondents of their attorneys' fees collected in any collection actions on the Northern Leasing respondents' behalf from April 11, 2013, to the present, to be disbursed to the defendants from whom the fees were collected. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); People v. Greenberg, 27 N.Y.3d at 497-98; People v. Applied Card Sys., 11 N.Y.3d at 125; People v. Ernst & Young, 114 A.D.3d at 570.

Petitioners also request a permanent injunction against respondents, which does not require proof of irreparable harm, People v. Greenberg, 27 N.Y.3d at 497, or a high percentage of violations in respondents' operations. [*44] State of New York v. Princess Prestige Co., 42 N.Y.2d at 107. Since Executive Law § 63(12) is remedial legislation on the State's behalf to prevent fraud, People v. Lexington Sixty-First Assoc., 38 N.Y.2d 588, 598, 345 N.E.2d 307, 381 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1976), and petitioners show a reasonable likelihood of continuing violations based on totality of the circumstances, People v. Greenberg, 27 N.Y.3d at 496-97, the court permanently enjoins respondents from conducting the business of equipment finance leasing or collection of debts under equipment finance leases and from purchasing, financing, transferring, servicing, or enforcing equipment finance leases. People v. Imported Quality Guard Dogs, Inc., 88 A.D.3d at 801-802. See People v. Coventry First LLC, 13 N.Y.3d at 114; State of
Since the Northern Leasing respondents procured their equipment finance leases through fraud under Executive Law § 63(12), the court rescinds their equipment finance leases entered from April 11, 2013, to the present. See People v. Coventry First LLC, 13 N.Y.3d at 113.

The court also vacates the default judgments obtained by respondents Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., Lease Finance Group LLC, MBF Leasing LLC, Lease Source-LSI, LLC a/k/a Lease Source, Inc., and Golden Eagle Leasing LLC against equipment leasing lessees or their guarantors in actions commenced in New York City Civil Court, New York County.


Within 60 days [*45] after implementation of the above relief, respondent Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., shall dissolve. BCL § 1101(a)(2).

This decision constitutes the court's order and judgment. The Clerk shall enter a judgment accordingly. The court will arrange a telephone conference with all parties June 22, 2020, at 3:00 p.m., to address the procedures for a hearing on restitution.

DATED: May 29, 2020

/s/ Lucy Billings

LUCY BILLINGS, J.S.C.

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1. At the time of service, I was at least 18 years of age.
2. My email address used to e-serve: tami.sims@katten.com
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**REQUEST FOR DEPUBLICATION:** Letter of Amici Curiae Requesting Depublication of the Lower Court Opinion

**ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS:** Attachment - State of NY v Northern Leasing Systems

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

06-30-2020
Date

/s/Tami Sims
Signature